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VAN INWAGEN’S MODAL ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILISM 
Katerina Psaroudaki 
                                                               INTRODUCTION 
Incompatibilism is the metaphysical view according to which, determinism is 
incompatible with free will; if determinism is true then humans don’t have free will or, 
alternatively, if humans possess freedom of will then determinism is false. On the other side of 
the debate, compatibilists argue that freedom of will is compatible with determinism; we could 
exercise our free will even if the future was totally determined by the past. Van Inwagen, in his 
paper “A Modal Argument for Incompatibilism”, puts forward a very compelling argument 
against compatibilism according to which, if we don’t “have a choice” about whether 
determinism is true nor do we “have a choice” about whether the past and the laws of nature are 
true then necessarily we don’t “have a choice” about the predetermined future either. In the 
present paper, I shall try to show that his argument doesn’t work by attacking the first premise. In 
arguing for that, I will proceed as follows: in section (I) I will briefly present the modal 
argument, in section (II) I will explain why the first premise is false or how the compatibilist 
could refute it under one possible understanding of it, and in section (III) I will attempt a 
different interpretation, which also fails to provide well-justified support to the first premise. One 
thing to keep in mind is that I won’t argue in favor of compatibilism and some of the ideas 
developed in this paper may count against it. My goal is modest: to demonstrate that Van 
Inwagen’s modal argument in favor of incompatibilism is flawed under the two interpretations of 
its first premise provided here.   
  
(I) VAN INWAGEN’S ARGUMENT 
Van Inwagen understands the Consequence Argument as follows: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the 
remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us 
what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present 
acts) are not up to us (2013, 117). 
The modal formulation of the argument is the following: 
(1) □ ((P0 & L) →P). 
(2) □ (P0 → (L→P)). 
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(3) N (P0 → (L→P)). 
(4) NP0. 
(5) NL. 
(6) Therefore, NP. 
Let us now explain what each of the variables in the modal argument denotes. ‘P0’ is an 
abbreviation of a proposition representing the state of the world at a particular instant in the 
remote past. ‘L’ is an abbreviation of a proposition representing the conjunction of all the laws of 
nature. ‘P’ is an abbreviation of a proposition describing the state of the world at a particular 
instant in the future. The operator ‘□’ represents broadly logical or metaphysical necessity and, 
lastly, the operator ‘N’ is an abbreviation of the proposition ‘No one has, or ever had, any choice 
about whether’.  
Let us next proceed with the justification of each premise. The first premise is, according 
to Van Inwagen, a logical consequence of determinism; it follows necessarily from the truth of 
determinism.  The second premise follows from the first by the application of elementary modal 
and sentential logic. The third premise follows from the second by the application of rule alpha 
‘□p →Np’: ‘No one has, or ever had, a choice about what is necessarily true’. The fourth premise 
is true since no one has any choice about what happened in the remote past: “The proposition 
that P0 is a proposition about the remote past. We could, if we like, stipulate that it is a 
proposition about the distribution and momenta of atoms and other particles in the inchoate, 
presiderial nebulae. Therefore, surely, no one has any choice about whether P0” (120). Likewise, 
premise (5) is true since no one has, or ever had any choice, about whether the laws of nature are 
true. The laws of nature, according to Van Inwagen, are basically laws of physics: “If it is a law 
of nature that angular momentum is conserved, then no one has any choice about whether 
angular momentum is conserved” (120). 
The conclusion follows from premises (3), (4) and (5) by the application of rule beta 
‘N(p→q), Np → Nq’: N(P0→(L→P)) entails NP0 →N(L→P) which entails N(L→P) given that 
NP0 is true, which further entails NP given NL and a second application of rule beta. Van 
Inwagen argues that the rule of inference beta is valid since he cannot think of any 
counterexamples where someone does not have a choice about whether ‘p→q’ nor does he have 
a choice about whether ‘p’, but, paradoxically, he does have a choice about whether ‘q’. For 
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example, if one has no choice about whether ‘If the sun explodes in 2000 AD, then all life on 
earth will end in 2000 AD, and he, also, has no choice about whether ‘The sun will explode in 
2000 AD’, then it seems to be logically impossible that he does have a choice about whether ‘All 
life on earth will end in 2000 AD’. Nevertheless, if determinism is compatible with freedom of 
will, Van Inwagen concedes, it’s possible that one has a choice about whether a proposition 
representing a future state of affairs in the world is true even though he has no choice about 
whether a proposition describing the remote past is true nor does he have a choice about whether 
the logical implications of determinism are true. But, he wants to test the validity of rule beta 
against counter-instances that do not presuppose the compatibility of freedom of will and 
determinism (123); as long as no such instances can be found, rule beta is valid.   
To sum up, if we don’t have a choice about whether ‘The remote past and the conjunction 
of the laws of nature entail the future’, nor do we have a choice about the remote past and the 
conjunction of the laws of nature, then we don’t have any choice about the future either. If 
freedom of will is defined as ‘the ability to do otherwise’ and determinism as the metaphysical 
view that ‘the past and the laws of nature entail the future’, Van Inwagen has shown that, 
determinism is incompatible with free will since it it rules out our ability to change the future and 
act differently than expected and predetermined.  
                                (II) FIRST INTERPRETATION OF THE PREMISE: 
NECESSARILY, THE PAST AND THE CONJUNCTION OF THE LAWS OF NATURE 
ENTAIL THE FUTURE 
In the present section I will a) suggest a possible interpretation of the first premise of the 
modal argument and b) explain why the premise is false provided that the suggested 
interpretation is correct. To remind you, Van Inwagen claims that if determinism is true, then it 
follows that ‘□ ((P0 & L) → P)’. One way to understand that is by identifying determinism with 
what is inside the parenthesis and explain how broadly logical necessity (the box outside the 
parenthesis) follows from the truth of determinism. In other words, we can assume that 
determinism is the metaphysical view that ‘the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature 
entail the future’ ((P0 & L) → P) and then argue for the inference: if determinism is true, then 
‘Necessarily, the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future’ (□ ((P0 & L) → 
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P) which is equivalent to saying that it is true in all metaphysically possible wolds that the past 
and the laws of nature entail the future. In what follows, I will provide three distinct arguments 
that could support the inference from the truth of determinism to the truth of the first premise 
(construed as such) and show how each one fails to do so.  
(i) The fatalist fallacy 
The first possible argument underlying the inference from the truth of determinism to the 
truth of the first premise could be reconstructed as follows: 
(1) □ (If determinism is true, then  (P0 & L) → P). 
(2) Determinism is true. 
(3) Therefore, □ ((P0 & L) → P). 
The first premise is true by definition and given the present interpretation that identifies 
determinism with what is inside the parenthesis (D= (P0 & L) → P): it’s necessarily true (or true 
in all metaphysically possible worlds) that if determinism is true then its conceptual and logical 
implications are also true. The second premise is true by assumption. Does the conclusion, 
though, logically follow from the premises? Certainly not; the above argument is logically 
fallacious. To see why, consider the following similarly structured argument: 
(1) □ (If John is a bachelor, then John is an unmarried man). 
(2) John is a bachelor. 
(3) Therefore, □ (John is an unmarried man). 
It can’t be true that ‘Necessarily, John is an unmarried man’ on the assumption that he is 
(contingently) a bachelor, despite the broadly logical necessity of the conceptual truth ‘If John is 
a bachelor, then John is an unmarried man’. On a similar vein, it can’t be true that ‘Necessarily, 
the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future’ on the assumption that 
determinism is true, even though it’s necessarily true that ‘If determinism is true, then the past 
and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future’. The argument is fallacious and thus 
cannot justify the inference from the assumption that determinism is true to the conclusion that 
‘□ (P0 & L) → P)’. 
(ii) What if determinism was necessarily true? 
The above argument could be reconstructed in a logically valid form by replacing the 
second premise with the assumption the determinism is necessarily true: 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(1) □ (If determinism is true, then (P0 & L) → P). 
(2) □ (Determinism is true). 
(3) Therefore, □ ((P0 & L) → P).  
Even though the argument is logically valid, we have good reasons to reject it by 
attacking the second premise. For one thing, Van Inwagen never makes the claim that 
determinism is necessarily true. For another, being a compatibilist does not commit one to the 
metaphysical necessity of determinism; Vihvelin, for instance, argues that determinism is an 
empirically contingent proposition that may be true in some metaphysically possible worlds but 
not in others, and that the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was initially fueled 
by the empirical success of science in making accurate predictions about the future (2013, 26). In 
addition, the debate between determinists and indeterminists seems to be inextricably tied with 
the recent discoveries in theoretical physics, with some determinists supporting their 
metaphysical views by appeal to deterministic natural theories (such as Newtonian Mechanics 
and Chaos theory) while indeterminists justifying their views on the basis of indeterministic 
theories in Quantum Mechanics (Hoefer, 2010). 
Granted all that, the burden of proof lies with the incompatibilist, who would like to 
pursue the present line of reasoning, to show how determinism could be understood as a 
metaphysically necessary proposition (such as the proposition ‘no one is taller than himself’ or 
‘if something is red, then it is also colored’), and, by so doing, convince the compatibilist who 
thinks that determinism is an empirically contingent view. Until then, the argument at issue, 
despite being logically valid, fails to establish its conclusion that ‘Necessarily, the past and the 
conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future’. 
(iii)‘Determinism is true’ and ‘The past and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail the 
future’ are logically equivalent propositions 
  Consider the following argument in support of the proposition ‘□ ((P0 & L) → P)’: 
(1) If determinism is true, then □ ((P0 & L) → P). 
(2) Determinism is true. 
(3) Therefore, □ ((P0 & L) → P). 
The argument is logically valid. To see what’s wrong with it, consider the following 
argument that exhibits the same logical structure:  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(1) If John is a bachelor, then □ (John is an unmarried man). 
(2) John is a bachelor. 
(3) Therefore, □ (John is an unmarried man). 
The argument is equally logically valid but it’s not sound because the first premise is 
false: even though in natural language the proposition ‘If John is a bachelor, then necessarily 
John is an unmarried man’ makes absolute sense, in Modal logic the correct formulation of the 
proposition is ‘□ (If John is a bachelor, then John is an unmarried man)’. Similarly, we can 
justifiably utter the proposition ‘If determinism is true, then necessarily the past and the 
conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future’, but the modal equivalent of the proposition 
should be ‘□ (If determinism is true, then the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail 
the future’. In that case, the argument would collapse to the fatalist fallacy discussed and 
dismissed in the first subsection. 
To put the objection to the present reconstruction of the argument in a different 
perspective, we could say that logically equivalent propositions are either both contingent or both 
necessarily true. The propositions ‘John is a bachelor’ and ‘John is an unmarried man’ are 
logically equivalent since they imply each other: if John is a bachelor, then John is an unmarried 
man and if John is an unmarried man, then John is a bachelor. As a result, if the proposition 
‘John is a bachelor’ is contingently true, so is the proposition ‘John is an unmarried man’. 
Likewise, the propositions ‘Determinism is true’ and ‘The past and the conjunction of the laws of 
nature entail the future’ are logically equivalent: if determinism is true, then the past and the 
conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future and vice versa. Therefore, if determinism is 
contingently true, so is its logically equivalent proposition ‘(P0 & L) → P’. The ‘□’ operator in 
front of the latter proposition would be justified iff determinism was necessarily true, and, as 
earlier shown, that is an assumption that not every compatibilist would endorse.   
To recapitulate the objections presented so far in this section: determinism could be 
understood either as contingently or as necessarily true. If Van Inwagen understood determinism 
to be an empirically contingent view, then he could not show that its logically equivalent 
proposition ‘The past and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail the future’ is necessarily 
true without committing a logical fallacy. If, on the other hand, he understood determinism to be 
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necessarily true, he would have a hard time convincing the compatibilists, who consider 
determinism to be empirically contingent, to accept an argument against their view based on an 
assumption that they clearly reject. Either way, the proposition ‘□ ((P0 & L) → P)’ does not 
justifiably follow from the proposition that determinism is true. 
(III) SECOND INTERPRETATION OF THE PREMISE: 
THE PAST AND THE CONJUNCTION OF THE LAWS OF NATURE LOGICALLY ENTAIL 
THE FUTURE 
In this section I shall try to provide a different interpretation of the first premise of Van 
Inwagen’s modal argument runs as follows: the ‘□’ operator, does not denote broadly logical or 
metaphysical necessity in the sense that the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature entail 
the future in all metaphysically possible worlds; rather, it denotes logical entailment in the sense 
that the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature logically entail the future exactly as the 
premises of a deductively valid argument logically entail its conclusion. For illustration, consider 
the following argument: 
(1) If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal. 
(2) Socrates is human. 
(3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
The argument is logically valid for if the premises are true then the conclusion is 
necessarily true. In a sense, the conjunction of the two premises logically entails the conclusion 
or, to put it in a modal form, ‘□ (P(1) & P(2) → C(3))’. In other words, it’s necessarily true that 
the conjunction of the propositions ‘If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal’ and ‘Socrates 
is human’ entails the proposition ‘Socrates is mortal’. Likewise, if determinism is true (even 
contingently), then it’s necessarily true that any proposition describing the world at a particular 
instant in the remote past along with a proposition representing the laws of nature in their totality 
logically entail a proposition describing the world at any particular instant in the future. Unlike 
the first interpretation which identifies determinism with the entailment inside the parenthesis 
(D= (P0 & L) → P), the current interpretation considers the whole premise, including the box 
operator, to be the definition of determinism (D= ⎕ ((P0 & L) → P)).  
To make this interpretation work, we need to reconstruct determinism as a deductively 
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valid argument. As a first approximation, and given what Van Inwagen says about the relevant 
propositions, the argument could be reconstructed along the following lines: 
(1) L1 & L2 & L3 & ... & Lν. 
(2) P0 = A description of the distribution and momenta of atoms and other particles in the 
inchoate presiderial nebulae. 
(3) Therefore, P = Jones will vote for the Democrats in the upcoming elections & P1 & P2 &… & 
Pν. 
The first premise unifies the laws of nature into a single proposition. The laws of nature 
are basically the laws of physics or natural sciences in general. In his paper ‘The Incompatibility 
of Free Will and Determinism’, Van Inwagen uses the term ‘laws of physics’ instead of ‘laws of 
nature’ since psychological voluntaristic laws fall under the latter and his argument applies only 
to the former: “I should not want to use, instead of ‘laws of physics’, some term like ‘laws of 
nature’ that might legitimately be applied to voluntaristic laws. Thus, for all that is said in this 
paper, it may be that some version of determinism based on voluntaristic laws is compatible with 
free will” (1974, 187). In the paper under discussion he uses the term ‘laws of nature’ but given 
the single example that he gives about the law of angular momentum conservation and the 
justification for premise (5) (‘NL’) which becomes almost uncontroversial if the laws ‘we have 
no choice about’ are laws of physics, we could safely draw the conclusion that the first premise 
of the deterministic argument is equivalent to a proposition representing the conjunction of all 
the ‘laws of physics’.  As far as the other two premises are concerned, the second is a description 
of the world at a particular instant in the remote past and the conclusion is a description of the 
world at a particular instant in the future consisting of a conjunction of different propositions (P, 
P1, P2,…, Pν) representing distinct but coexisting states of affairs in the world. 
One condition that a deductively valid argument needs to meet is the following: the terms 
appearing in the conclusion need to be equivalent in meaning with the terms appearing in the 
premises. For example, the terms ’Socrates’ and ‘mortal’ preserve their meaning throughout the 
argument given earlier. If ‘Socrates’ referred to the ancient Greek philosopher in the first premise 
and, say, a horse in the conclusion, the argument wouldn’t be logically valid. The same logic 
must apply to the deterministic argument: we need to make sure that each of the terms appearing 
in the description of the future world has an equivalent term in either the first premise 
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representing the conjunction of all the natural laws or the second premise representing the 
physical state of the world at a particular instant in the remote past. Some propositions about the 
future, though, such as the proposition ‘Jones will vote for the Democrats in the upcoming 
elections’, include terms (‘vote’, ‘Democrats’, ‘elections’) that do not figure in the laws of nature 
nor in the physical description of the world in the remote past. Therefore, the past and the 
conjunction of the natural laws do not logically entail all propositions about the future since 
some terms appearing in the latter do not have a logical equivalent in the former, and, thus,  the 
present interpretation fails to establish a logically plausible first premise. In what follows, I will 
consider three objections to my argument.  
(i) Why not reduce the natural kind predicates in the conclusion to the natural kind predicates in 
the first premise?   
Someone might argue that one way to make the argument deductively valid is by 
reducing some of the terms figuring in the future description of the world to the natural kind 
predicates figuring in the laws of nature as represented in the first premise. The problem, though, 
with the present suggestion is that for some propositions, such as ‘Jones will vote for the 
Democrats in the upcoming elections’, no corresponding physical description could be given that 
would logically (semantically) subsume the proposition under some natural kind predicate 
appearing in any of the natural laws depicted in the first premise. What explains the irreducibility 
of natural kind predicates of the social sciences (‘vote’, ‘elections’, etc.) to natural kind 
predicates of the physical sciences is, following Jerry Fodor, the multiple physical realization of 
social events.   
In his paper ‘Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis)’ (1994), Jerry Fodor specifies one condition that is necessary for a successful 
reduction of the laws of special sciences (psychology, economics, anthropology e.t.c.) to the laws 
of physics: the formulation of bridge laws that connect each predicate of the special sciences 
laws with a predicate of the physical laws. Suppose that ‘S1x → S2x’ is a law of the special 
sciences and ‘P1x → P2x’ is a law of physics, then in order to reduce the former to the latter we 
need to establish two bi-directional bridge laws: ‘S1x↔P1x’ and ‘S2x ↔ P2x’. Fodor argues that 
such bridge laws connecting special and natural predicates are hard to establish due to the 
multiple physical realizability of the events investigated by the special sciences. For example, the 
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predicate ‘monetary exchange’ appearing in Gresham’s law cannot be reduced to a natural 
predicate since the event described by the special predicate could be realized by many distinct 
physical events involving dollar bills, strings of wampum, signing one’s name to a check and so 
on (691).  
On a similar vein, any proposition that describes a human action employing predicates of 
the special sciences fails to correspond to an equivalent description in the vocabulary of physics 
if that action is multiply realizable by distinct physical events. Take, for example, the proposition 
‘Jones will vote for the Democrats in the upcoming elections’. The event that falls under the 
special predicate ‘vote’ could be realized in many physical ways, such as writing something 
down in a piece of paper, raising one’s hand, submitting an electronic form, making an utterance, 
and so on. That being the case, neither the special predicate ‘vote’ nor the whole proposition 
could be identified with a single physical description in virtue of which they would, individually 
or jointly, fall under some law of nature. As a consequence, reducing the special predicates 
included in some future descriptions of the world to the natural kind predicates figuring in the 
laws of nature does not seem to be a promising route for formulating a deductively valid 
deterministic argument.      
(ii) Freedom of will is at stake, not freedom of action 
Someone might object that what is at stake in the debate between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists is whether freedom of will, instead of freedom of action, is compatible with 
determinism. It may be true that the event described by the proposition ‘Jones will vote for the 
Democrats in the upcoming elections’ could be realized in many distinct physical events but, 
nevertheless, the event represented by the proposition ‘Jones will decide/intend to vote for the 
Democrats in the upcoming elections’ is uniquely realized in a single neurological event 
occurring in the human brain. Given what Van Inwagen says about the laws of chemistry -“Thus, 
a law about chemical valences is a law of physics in my sense, even if chemistry is not ultimately 
‘reducible’ to physics” (187) - we can defensibly conclude that he would be willing to include 
the laws of neuroscience in the conjunction of all the natural laws, and further argue that we 
could reconstruct a deductively valid deterministic argument by reducing the terms describing 
future manifestations of the human will to the natural kind predicates of neuroscience.  
Three responses to the above objection: first, a successful formulation of the 
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deterministic argument into a deductively valid argument requires more than the mere 
replacement of the proposition ‘Jones will decide/intend to vote for the Democrats in the 
upcoming elections’ with a physical description in the vocabulary of neuroscience. What is 
needed is a strict correspondence between the proposition and the natural kind predicates 
(=bound variables in scientific laws) appearing in the relevant law of neuroscience. Even if the 
event is uniquely realizable by a single neurological event in the brain, the description of the 
neurological event is not necessarily equivalent to a natural kind predicate of neuroscience, as in 
the example of ‘monetary exchange’ where its physical description (‘signing one’s name on a 
paycheck’, say) does not correspond to any natural kind predicate of the laws of nature.   
Second, Fodor argues that it’s nomologically possible that creatures other than human 
beings (such as automata) could satisfy natural kind predicates in psychology without satisfying 
natural kind predicates in neuroscience. Given that every identity should be nomologically and 
counterfactually necessary, the nomologically possible realizability of psychological events by 
non-neurological events renders the identification of psychological natural kind predicates with 
neurological natural kind predicates impossible (692-3). Thus, the counterfactual possibility of 
the event ‘Jones will decide/intend to vote for the Democrats in the upcoming elections’ being 
multiply realizable by distinct physical events hinders the reduction of the proposition to the 
vocabulary of neuroscience and, as a result, subverts the reconstruction of the deterministic 
argument in a deductively valid way.   
Third, the deterministic argument would be deductively valid if and only if every possible 
term appearing in the future description of the world was logically equivalent to some term 
appearing in the premises. As long as there are terms representing human actions (‘vote’, 
‘elections’, etc.) that cannot be semantically reduced to the natural kind predicates of natural 
laws or the terms figuring in the physical description of the world in the remote past, the past and 
the conjunction of the laws of nature do not logically entail all future propositions. If 
determinism is necessarily true in the way suggested by the present interpretation, we should be 
able to formulate a deductively valid argument that logically entails in its conclusion all possible 
descriptions of the future state of the world and not just those that are relevant to the debate of 
free will.   
 11
(iii) Why not include the laws of special sciences in the first premise? 
Someone might suggest including the laws of special sciences in the conjunction of all 
the laws of nature. By doing so, we could reduce some of the terms appearing in the conclusion 
of the deterministic argument to some of the terms appearing in its first premise. However, as 
previously said, Van Inwagen would not include the laws of special sciences - or, in his own 
terminology, the voluntaristic laws - in the conjunction of the laws of nature, for he thinks that 
determinism based on voluntaristic laws may be compatible with freedom of will. A 
deterministic argument including natural kind predicates of the special sciences in its first 
premise could be reconstructed in a deductively valid way, but it would not be compatible with 
the version of determinism that Van Inwagen considers to be crucial to the free will debate.  
                                                CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have tried to provide two different interpretations of the first premise of 
Van Inwagen’s modal argument for incompatibilism and show why the premise is false under 
each one of them. According to the first interpretation, the premise ‘□ ((P & L) → P)’ is 
equivalent to the proposition ‘Necessarily, the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature 
entail the future’, which could be refuted by showing that determinism is an empirically 
contingent view - tightly correlated with the success of scientific predictability - and so must be 
its logical consequences. According to the second interpretation, the premise ‘□ ((P & L) → P)’ 
is equivalent to the proposition ‘the past and the conjunction of the laws of nature logically entail 
the future’, which would be true only if every proposition describing the world at a particular 
instant in the future was logically equivalent to some natural kind predicate of a natural science. 
The propositions describing future psychological events are irreducible to propositions 
representing natural kind predicates of neuroscience, and thus, the first premise is false. 
Assuming that I have provided an exhaustive list of interpretations, we can safely conclude that 
Van Inwagen’s modal argument for incompatibilism fails to establish its conclusion because it 
presupposes a definition of determinism that is either incongruent with the prevailing current 
views or logically implausible.  
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